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                       OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
                                I. 
     Appellant, Yiannakis John Televantos, brought suit in the United 
States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against his former 
employer, Lyondell 
Chemical Company ("Lyondell"), seeking benefits payable under a Change of 
Control 
Plan (the "Plan") applicable when an employee resigns within two years of 
a change of 
control due to the occurrence of a relocation of the employee's principal 
place of work. 
Televantos was employed by ARCO Chemical Company ("ARCO") in Newtown 
Square, 
Pennsylvania as Vice President for the Research and Development Business 
Urethanes.  
In anticipation of a possible takeover, ARCO developed and adopted a 
Change of Control 
Plan in April 1998.  The Plan is an employee benefit plan governed by the 
requirements 
and provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 
1974, 29 
U.S.C.  1001 et. seq. (2001).  
     The Plan provides, inter alia, payment of severance benefits to 
qualifying 
participants for the purpose of enabling the company to "be able to retain 
the services of 
its executives and personnel in the event of a Change of Control of the 
Company, during 
the pendency of a possible Change of Control, and following a Change of 
Control, to 
ensure their continued dedication and efforts in any such event without 
undue concern for 
their personal financial and employment security."  App. at 389. 
     Article V, Paragraph 5.1(a) provides for benefits if, within two 
years of a change 
of control, the participant's employment "terminates for any reason . . . 
other than . . . (D) 
a termination, voluntary resignation or retirement by the Participant 
without Good 
Reason."  App. at 397.  "Good Reason" is defined in Article II, Paragraph 
2.11 as "the 
occurrence after a Change of Control of any of the following events or 
conditions," 
including "the relocation of the Participant's principal place of work, 
but only if the 
'moving expenses' incurred in connection with such relocation would be 
deductible under 
Section 217 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended."  App. at 
394.  The 
referenced section of the tax code provides that moving expenses "paid or 
incurred . . . in 
connection with the commencement of work . . . at a new principal place of 
work" are 
deductible if, inter alia, they involve a move of greater than fifty 
miles.  I.R.C.  
217(a),(c) (2001). 
     At the time the Plan was distributed to employees, ARCO also 
distributed a 
Summary of the Change of Control Plan (the "Summary").  The Summary 
explicitly 
states that it is not meant to replace the official Plan documents, which 
govern in the 
event of any inconsistency with the Summary.  The Summary states that, as 
"an 
additional measure of protection for employees," an employee "may elect to 
leave the 
Company and still be entitled to receive" Plan benefits.  App. at 413.  In 
describing 
circumstances under which this could happen, the Summary states that an 
individual in 
Televantos' employment level "may elect to terminate employment upon 
request or 
requirement . . . to relocate to a new work location."   App. at 413. 
     In July 1998, Lyondell acquired all of the stock of ARCO through a 
cash tender 
offer and as a result acquired control of ARCO.  This stock acquisition 
constituted a 
"change of control" under the Plan.  On March 30, 1999, Lyondell sent 
Televantos a letter 
offering him employment at the same position he held with ARCO, and had 
held since the 
change in control, and stating that on or about February 1, 2000, his 
position "will be 
located" in Houston.  Similar letters were sent to a number of employees.  
The letter 
further stated that "[i]f you decline this offer, you will be eligible for 
the Change of 
Control package.  However, in order to receive this payment, you must 
complete all 
transitional assignments.  This date is determined by management at the 
sole discretion of 
management."  App. at 385.  The letter asked Televantos to respond by 
April 30, 1999 as 
to whether he would accept or decline this offer.  
     On May 7, 1999, Televantos returned the letter stating that he would 
decline the 
offer to relocate in his position to Houston.  Soon thereafter, he 
accepted an offer of 
employment with Foamex, a local company and customer of Lyondell, with 
whom 
Televantos had been in employment negotiations since prior to his receipt 
of the March 
30 letter.  His employment agreement with Foamex was dated May 21, 1999 
but included 
a provision stating that his employment would not begin until he had 
completed his 
"transitional work assignments" with Lyondell.  App. at 423.  However, the 
Agreement 
also bound Televantos to "devote his entire working time" to Foamex 
beginning on May 
21, 1999.  On May 21, 1999, Televantos met with his supervisor at Lyondell 
and 
informed him that he had accepted a position with Foamex, would complete 
all 
transitional assignments with Lyondell, and wanted to receive the Plan 
benefits.  In the 
next two weeks, Lyondell informed Televantos that his last day of work 
would be June 
11, 1999.  Continued employment with Lyondell and the completion of 
transitional 
assignments was deemed impossible because Foamex's position as a customer 
of 
Lyondell created a conflict of interest. 
     When Televantos inquired about the amount of his Plan benefits, he 
was informed 
by Lyondell's Vice President of Human Resources that he would not be 
receiving any 
benefits under Article V.  Televantos brought this lawsuit against 
Lyondell seeking these 
benefits under the Plan.  The District Court conducted a bench trial and 
found in favor of 
Lyondell, concluding that the Plan's definition of "Good Reason" was not 
ambiguous and 
required the "actual occurrence of the relocation of the participant's 
principal place of 
work."  App. at 5-7. 
                              II. 
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
     The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331 
because the 
complaint sought benefits under 29 U.S.C.  1132(a)(1)(B).  This court has 
jurisdiction 
over the final decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
1291.  Televantos 
filed a timely appeal. 
     Traditional rules of contract construction govern our review of an 
employment 
benefit plan under ERISA.  See Int'l Union v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 
130, 138 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  The determination of whether a provision of a contract is 
clear or ambiguous 
is a question of law subject to plenary review by this court.  See Bill 
Gray Enters., Inc. 
Employee Health and Welfare Plan v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 
2001); 
Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997). 
B.  Contract Ambiguity 
     Televantos argues that the District Court erred in finding the 
relevant terms of the 
Plan unambiguous.  He argues that the Plan's definition of "Good Reason" 
was 
ambiguous and he posits an interpretation of that term that would entitle 
him to benefits.  
In order to evaluate his claim, we must first examine the terms of the 
document to 
determine if the relevant provisions are clear or ambiguous.  Employee 
benefits plans 
governed by ERISA are subject to the same principles as contracts in 
general.  See In re 
Unisys Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan ERISA Litig., 97 F.3d 710, 715 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  
     "A [contract] term is ambiguous if it is susceptible to reasonable 
alternative 
interpretations."  Sanford Inv. Co. v. Ahlstrom Mach. Holdings, Inc., 198 
F.3d 415, 421 
(3d Cir. 1999).  To determine whether a clause is ambiguous, "courts must 
first look to 
the plain language of [the] document."  Bill Gray, 248 F.3d at 218.  While 
the strongest 
evidence of whether a contract is unambiguous are the words of the 
agreement, we may 
consider additional sources if necessary to determine if the words of the 
contract were 
given their common meaning.  These additional sources include "'the 
contract language, 
the meanings suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic evidence offered in 
support of each 
interpretation.  Extrinsic evidence may include the structure of the 
contract, the 
bargaining history, and the conduct of the parties that reflects their 
understanding of the 
contract's meaning.'"  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 270 F.3d 
135, 139 (3d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Teamsters Indus. Employees Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce 
Motor Cars, 
Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Once a contract's terms are 
found unambiguous, 
we may no longer consider extrinsic evidence in order to interpret those 
terms.  Bill Gray, 
248 F.3d at 218. 
     The relevant language in this case is the language of the Plan quoted 
above 
defining what constitutes "Good Reason."  The District Court concluded 
that this 
language was not ambiguous and held that "relocation . . . means what it 
says, there must 
be relocation - - there must be an occurrence of the relocation."  App. at 
6.  In other 
words, the Plan requires the employee to remain with the company until his 
or her place 
of work actually moves to a new location.  The District Court concluded 
that "[g]iven the 
words occurrence in conjunction with relocation of the principal place of 
work, and 
moving expenses incurred, past tense, then it follows that there must have 
been - - there 
would have to be an actual occurrence of the relocation of the 
participant's principal place 
of work."  App. at 7.  
     Giving the contract terms their common and accepted meanings, the 
words of the 
provision support the District Court's conclusion that the provision is 
unambiguous: 
"Good reason" means the "occurrence" of "the relocation of the 
Participant's principal 
place of work."  App. at 394.  The latter part of the provision is also 
unambiguous, stating 
that the relocation serves as Good Reason "only if the 'moving expenses' 
incurred in 
connection with such relocation would be deductible" under the provision 
of the tax code 
defining "moving expenses."  App. at 394.  The clear import of this 
segment of the 
provision is to convey that the relocation contemplated must be, inter 
alia, to a location in 
excess of fifty miles away, and that relocations to areas closer do not 
qualify as Good 
Reason to resign and receive benefits.   
     The District Court seemed to place some emphasis on the fact that the 
word 
"incurred" was in the past tense, and Televantos argues that the District 
Court erroneously 
interpreted the provision to require that the employee must have 
physically moved and 
incurred expenses in order to receive the benefits under the Plan.  If the 
District Court 
read the Plan to have required an actual move by an employee before 
severance payments 
would be due, then that reading would be erroneous, as Televantos argues.  
But contracts 
must not be read in a light that leads to an unreasonable outcome.  See 
Bohler-Uddeholm 
America Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Although the word 
"incurred" is in the subjunctive rather than in the past tense, that is 
not really the issue.  
What controls instead are the facts that the required "relocation" refers 
to an actual 
change in the principal place of work   something that had not taken place 
before 
Televantos left his employment   and that the provision about moving 
expenses refers to 
those that would be incurred in connection with "such relocation."  Thus, 
the Plan does 
not require that the employee himself have entered into a physical move, 
but rather that 
the employee's principal place of work must have moved. Therefore, reading 
the District 
Court's opinion in its entirety, we read it as holding that employees are 
eligible for 
benefits when their principal place of work makes the actual transition 
from one location 
to another location at least fifty miles away.   
     Under our plenary review, this court can look to extrinsic evidence 
to determine if 
the words of the contract are ambiguous.  Televantos would have us look to 
the Summary 
of the Plan created by ARCO and distributed to ARCO employees, which 
states in part: 
          To provide an additional measure of protection for employees . . 
. under 
     certain specified circumstances, an individual may elect to leave the 
     Company and still be entitled to receive the change-of-control 
allowances 
     under the Plan.  In general accord with industry practices, these 
     circumstances are somewhat different for specified levels of employee 
. . . 
     for [individuals in Televantos' employment level] . . . an individual 
in these 
     grade levels may elect to terminate employment upon request or 
     requirement to . . . relocate to a new work location.   
App. at 413 (emphasis added). 
     Televantos would have us hold that the March letter notifying him 
that his position 
would relocate to Houston in February 2000 was a "request or requirement" 
to relocate, 
triggering his eligibility for benefits according to the Summary.  We 
agree with the 
District Court's conclusion that the Summary does not render the Plan's 
terms 
ambiguous.  While the Summary is written in terms of "request" or 
"requirement" to 
relocate as opposed to the "occurrence" of relocation, the terms of the 
Summary still 
comport with the terms of the Plan.  Like the Plan, the Summary refers to 
"a new work 
location"   something that did not exist at the time of the request, but 
was instead an 
aspect of Lyondell's future planning. 
     Accordingly, the more reasonable reading of the Plan is that it 
requires employees 
to remain with the company until the time their principal place of work 
relocates because 
such a policy (1) provides the company with the security of a stable work 
force during a 
time of transition and (2) rewards those employees with generous 
compensation to 
provide them with security after their place of work relocates and they 
choose not to 
follow.  In fact, Televantos' place of work never did move to Texas 
because of a 
subsequent sale of the relevant work place to a local company.   
     As the District Court noted, "Dr. Televantos chose not to take the 
risk associated 
with staying with Lyondell."  App. at 10.  By choosing to leave when his 
"status, title or 
responsibilities were not changed and [his] position was not relocated in 
fact," Televantos 
became ineligible for Plan benefits.  App. at 9.  We agree.
                              III. 
     For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
___________________ 
TO THE CLERK: 
                                                             Please file 
the foregoing opinion. 
 
 
             
                                                                /s/ 
Dolores K. Sloviter                               
                                   Circuit Judge
                                 
 
